PLATT V. MEAD. 93 �and let and rented the rest, and collected the rents in his o-wn name and appropriated the moneys to his own use; that he thereby ac- quired credit and standing in the community as a person entitled to credit, and uppn such credit contracted divers large amounts of debts with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, to-wit, some 10 persons especially named holding claims to upwards of $40,000 still unpaid, besides others not named; that his wife was privy to the designs alleged, and aided therein, and held the title in secret trust for her husband; that by deed dated Jane 22, 1875, and recorded June 24, 1875, said Abraham Mead and wife conveyed said premises to a relative, the defendant James G. Mead, a baker, of little or no property, carrying on a small business at Sing Sing, for the nominal consideration of $300,000, the estimated value of the property, subject to mortgages for $172,150 and taxes of 1874; that James G. Mead paid no consideration for such conveyanee, and took the title in aid and furtherance of the fraudulent scheme of said Abraham Mead and Sarah Mead to hinder, delay, and defraud cred- itors, to cover the premises from them, and to complicate and em- barrass them in obtaining payment of their debts out of the said premises; that said James never took actual possession, but that Abraham is still in possession, claiming that he collects the rents as agent of James. �The. original bill did not state any facts in regard to Littlefield's existing debt, except the original judgment of 1866, nor specify any subsequent creditors or their claims. The demurrer to the original complaint was, therefore, sustajned on the ground that the complaint did not disclose, as to Littlefield, any existing equity which the as- signee could enforoe, and as to subsequent creditors none were shown to have been defrauded where claims are still unpaid. These objec- tions do not apply to the amended bill, which shows numerous subse- quent creditors, alleged to have been thus defrauded, holding claims to upwards of $40,000 still unpaid, and that final judgment was not recovered in Littlefield's favor until April, 1875. From. the opening of the default in August, 1866, until final judgment in 1875, Little- field could neither issue execution nor file any bill in equity based on his first judgment by default. His equitable cause of action did not accrue until after the final judgment in 1876, and execution returned unsatisfied. He had six years from that date, but for proceedings in bankruptcy, in which to proeeed against any equitable assets of his judgment debtor. N. Y. Code, §§ 382, 1871; Eyre v. Beebe, 28 How. (N. Y.) 383. ��� �
