PLATT V. MEAD. 97 �Not having filed any such bill prior to the proceedings in bank- ruptcy, he -would seem-to be within the prohibition of section 5106, •which prohibits suits thereafter against the bankrupt in law or equity. If so, then suit by the assignee for the same purpose must be allowed ex necessitate to prevent a failure of justice; for other- ■wise both assignee and crediter would be remediless. Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20. Nor can it be snpposed that the statutory period allowed for commencing actions for relief in such ca'ses was intended, by the bankrupt act, to be suddenly eut off and all remedy thereafter precluded for the benefit of the bankrupt who had com- mitted the fraud, or of his fraudulent grantee. If, therefore, upon the facts stated in the bill, the subsequent creditors would have been entitled to equitable relief after the recovery of judgment and return of execution unsatisfied upon their respective claims, I have no doubt that the plaintiff, as assignee in bankruptcy, is entitled to similar relief in this action without those prerequisites. �The other general averments in the bill seem to me to be suffieient upon demurrer to entitle both existing and subsequent creditors to relief. The conveyance to the wife of the lots contra cted for by the husband, in his own name, for the purpose of building upon them ; his payment of $30,000 ; the consideration of the conveyance when largely in debt and in embarrassed circumstances ; his subsequent taking possession and building thereon during several years follow- ing, and his expending $125,000 or upwards in so doing; his repre- sentations during all this time that he was the owner, and contract- ing large debts, which are still unpaid, on the strength of the credit so acquired; and the subsequent conveyance of all this property, with more than $150,000 of the debtor's means thus expended upon it, to a relative in Sing Sing of little or no property, without consid- eration, followed by the apparent insolvency of both husband and wife, — are stated in the complaint as parts of one continuons transao- tion, and of a premeditated seheme to cheat and defraud creditors, both existing and subsequent. �U|)on these facts, if proved without explanation, a court or jury would be warranted in finding, if not compelled to find, that such was the actual intent. And upon such a finding whatever doubt, if any, may exist as to the liability of the lots to subsequent creditors, to the extent of the original consideration paid therefor, under the New York statute, no doubt can exist as to their right to follow the v.9.no.2— 7 ��� �
