140 FEDKRAL BEPOBTEfi. �"It has, indeed, been questioiied whother a receipt given by a Ciuricr for goods or merchandise placed in his banda for transportation from oiie part of the same country to another, along the Une of a canal or railroad, is a bill of lading in the sense of the commercial law, or within the rule of Liokharrow v. Mason. But this doubt has but little foundation in reason, and is impliedly excluded by the decisions in this country, which treat the legal eiiect of instruments of this description as the same, whether the property which they represent is carried by land or across the ocean." 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. (7th Ed.) 1205, rearg. p. 900. See, also, 2 Daniell, Neg. Inst. (2d Ed.) § 1732 ; 1 Par- sons, Ship. & Adm. 134; Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Bill of Lading," and cases cited. �The argument of learned counsel for the plaintiiis, that this exemp- tion of the owner of a ship from liability for the fraud of tKe master in issuing a false bill of lading growa out of the peouliarities of the laws oJE the sea, ^nd is founded on the principle that the ship is bound to the freight and the freight to the, ship, is a misapprehension, I think, of the meaning of the supreme court in "the ScTiooner Freeman Case, for the court distinctly places its judgment as well upon the warit of authorityin the master as an agen,t. See The Williams, 1 Brown, Adm. at p. 219; The Pauline, 1 Eiss. 390. �And in respect, to the, intimations that thqre is a different rule between an assignee who has in good faith advanced money on the faith of the bill of lading and the original parties, I can only say that< in my judgment, no such distinction exists. These intimations are all founded on doubts and conflicts that were set at rest by Grant v. Norway, -which is a direct authority against them. The Schooner Freeman Case approves that of Orant v. Norway, viSia itself a case of advancement of money on the faith of a false bill of lading, and must bind us here, both in its principle and its precedent. Besides, I have no doubt, for the reasons I have stated, that it is the correct principle, and it is a mistake to suppose that the interests of commerce require that the common carriers of the country shall become the insurers or guarantors of merchants who choose to make, in their dealings with each other, a convenience of their bills of lading. �It is proper that I should give attention to the conflict of authority in the state courts, though in this matter of general commercial law I should feel at liberty to act independently, without attempting to reconcile the conflict, and follow the guidance that seems to me plainly pointed out by the federal adjudications I have consulted. The New York commission of appeals has deliberately overruled both the courts of Bngland and the supreme court of the United States, though the lamented author of Hutchinson on Carriers seems ��� �
