242 FEDESAIi BEFOBTEB. �matter which must be determined at the hearing of the petition, and the judgment of the court thereon, if rendered upon legal notice, caunot be ques- tioned collaterally. It may be reviewed, and, if erroneous, corrected on ap- peal, but not otherwise." 20 Cal. 313. �If these ]urisdictional facts, once so determined on proper allega- tions and proofs, cannot be afterwards queationed collaterally, why should not a similar determination of the fact of inhabitancy, alao, be conclusive ? The same rule bas, also, been established in many of the other states. See Fisherv. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119; Andrews v. Avory, i Gratt. 229 ; Abbott v. Coburn, 28 Vt, 667 ; Burdett v. Silsbee, 15 Tex. 615; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 264; Bumsted w.Read, 31 Barb. 664; Bolton v. Brewster, 32 Barb. 393. In Massachusetts a different view was taken in Cutts v. Haskins, 9 Mass. 547, but the character of the court does not appear, nor does it appear that there was any petition stating the jurisdictional facts. The court did pasa upon the fact of residence, but it does not appear that the propriety of entering upon that inquiry was argued or decided, or even ques- tioned. The editer of the Massachusetts Reports, in a i;ote to the decision, calls attention to these points, and questions the decision on the ground that when the facts are averred in the petition, the determination should be conclusive. This case was afterwards fol- lowed in the same state in 5 Pick. 20, and 9 Pick. 259. But the great weight of authority, and, to my apprehension, the entire weight of reason, is the other way, and in favor of conclusiveness of the adjudication. �I should not have deemed it necessary to enter so f ully into the discussion of the question, or to quote so largely f rom the authorities, had it not been for the case of Thompson v. Whitman, 18 "Wall. 460, which libellant's counsel bas cited, and pressed in the argument and petition for rehearing with unusual earnestness and zeal, as well as manifest confidence and sincerity, as being directly in point and con- trolling in this caae. Did I suppose the supreme court intended in that decision to coyer this^ case, I certainly should yield to its superior authority; but I cannot, after a full consideration of the case, satisfy myself that the supreme court designed the decision to be so far-reaching in its effects. It must be admitted that there is general language used in the opinion, which, considered by itself, lends some countenance to the view maintained by counsel. But if he is correct in the rule assumed to be established by that authority, then there is no jurisdictional fact that can be conclus! vely deter- mined by any court under any circumstances, and in all the cases to ��� �
