STEAM STONE-CUTTER CO. «. 8EABS. 11 �all, but are all together in one body, and left to operate on the law side or equity side of the court as they may be applicable. The laws of the state, adopted by this rule, are as applicable to equity cases as they are to common-law cases, and, not being restricted by the rule to either, must have been intended for both. This rule covers the issuing and force of this writ. The power to make such a rule in cases where the supreme court has not acted is as well conferred as the power of that court to make rules for the circuit and district courts is. The language conferring it is as explicit, and cornes from the same authority. In Beera v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, Mr. Justice Strong said : �"State laws cannot control the exercise of the powers of the national gov- emment, or in any manner limit or affect the operation of the process or pro- ceedingB of the national courts. The whole efflcacy of such laws in the courts of the United States depends upon the enactments of congress. So far as they are adopted by congress they are obligatory. Beyond this they have no con- trolling Influence. CJongress may adopt such state laws directly by a sub- stantlve enactment, or they may conflde the authority to adopt them to the courts of the United States. The constitutional validity and extent of the power thus given to the courts of the United States to make alterations and additions in the process, as well as in the modes of proceeding in suits, was f ully considered by this court in the cases of Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, and Bank of U. S. v. Haistead, 10 Wheat. 51. The resuit of this doc- trine, as practlcally expounded or applied in the case of Bank of U. S. v. HalsteacL, is that the courts may, by their rules, not only alter the forms, but the effect and operation of the process, whethermesne or final, and the modes of proceeding under it." �In Bank of U. S. v. Halatead, it was held that the law of the United States, authorizing the courts of the United States to alter their processes, authorized them to so alter them as to make lands subject to execution which were not so subject under state laws. The objec- tion was made there, as it had been in Wayman v. Southard, that congress could not delegate such powers to the courts, because they were legislative powers. �In Wayman v. Southard, Chief Justice Marshall said, as to this objection: �"If congress cannot invest the courts with the power of altering the modes of proceeding of their own offlcers, in the service of executions issued on their own judgments, how will gentlemen defend a delegation of the same power to the state legislatures ? The state assemblies do not constitute a legislative body for the Union. They possess no portion of that legislative power which the constitution vests in congress, and cannot receive it by delegation." ��� �
