326 FEDERAL BKPOBTEB. �every legitimate way. But in the construction both of contracta and statu tes, the interit of the framers and parties is to be sought, first of all, in the words and language employed, and if the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what bas no need of interpretation, and when the words have a defluite and precise meaning to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes and contracta should be read and understood according to the natural and most obvions iraport of the language, without resort to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation." �Now the language of this aot is plain and unambiguous. Accord- ing to its grammatical construction, and the natural and obvions meaning of the words used, it prohibita every seizure of the kind described by force of any provision of title 34r. The seizure in this case is one of the kind described, viz., of a vessel employed as a common carrier, where neither master nor owner was a consenting party or privy to the illegal act, and the seizure is made under title 34 exclu- sively. The seizure by a marshal for a penalty is as much a "seiz- ure," both in the ordinary meaning of that word and in its legal sense, as a seizure by a revenue offieer for the purpose of forfeiture. To seize is to "take hold of suddenly and forcibly; to take possession of by force." Worcester's Dict. In law, seizure is "the act of taking possession by virtue of an execution or legal authority." Bouvier's Law Dict. As respects the fact of seizure it matters not by what legal offieer, or in what kind of a proceeding, such forcible possession is taken ; nor does it make any difference to the owner of the vessel, or to the public who may have taken passage in her, or laden her hold with goods for immediate transportation, whether the seizure and the inter- ruption of her journey come from a revenue offieer or a marshal. Whether done by the one or by the other, the act of each, the seizure itself, the forcible taking possession, is precisely the same in both cases. �The word "seizure" applies equally to both. It manifestly describes the one kind as aptly and as naturally as the other. In the act of 1881 there is no indication that the word "seizure" is not used in its general legal as well as popular sense. There is no evidence in the act itself of any intention to limit its application to seizures by one class of officers and in one kind of proceedings, and to exclude other seizures in other proceedings under title 34. No such distinction is made. Moreover, in passing this act, congress must be presumed to have been aware of the two different proceedings and modes of seizure ��� �
