IN BE m'kenna. 27 �service. It. is not claimed that section 5438 applies to the purchase of clothing from them; nor do I think that the clothing issued to them is used in the military service of the United States, �Congress eould prohably prohihit the purchase of clothing from these inmates, and punish any one applying it to other purposes than that for which it is issued; but the law in force does not apply to it, and the demurrer must be sustained. ���In Be MoKenna, Bankrupt. {Dist/riet Court, W. O. Ten-nessee, September 30, 1881.) �1. HUSBAND AKD WlFE — SetTLEMBNT ON THB WlFE — HUBBAND'B IntEBEBT — �Construction. �It is a general principle, established by the authorlties, that whenever a set- tlement is made upon a married woman by will, deed, or other conveyance, or by statute, the husband's interests are unafEected, furtJier than the terms of the instrument or statute, either directly or by necessary implication, require ; and it is well-settled that neither exclusion during the life of the wife from the rents and profits, restrictions upon his powers of alienation, or the grant to her of powers of alienation, act to destroy his interest after her death, unless the settlement explicitly does so by appropriate terms, or by the exercise of the powers conf erred hia interest is defeated during her life. �2. 8ahb Subjbct — Bankrdptcy— Tknanot ht the Curtesy — Tennessee Code, �a 2481, 2482— Pbopbbty Exbbipt— Rev. 8t. i 5045— Assionkk's Title— Sub- sbqubntly-Acquirbd Pbopbett. �A State statute provided that the interest of a husband in the real estate of his wife should not, during her life, be sold or disposed of by virtue of any judg- ment, decree, or execution against him, nor should the busbaad and wife be ejected or dispossessed of the real estate of the wife by virtue of any such judg- ment, sentence, or decree, nor should the husband sell his wife's real estate during her life without her joining in the conveyance in the manaer prescribed by law in which married women shall convey lands. The wife was seized of lands when the husband became bankrupt, there being issue of the marriage. Hela, that the tenancy by the curtesy initiate passed to the assignee in bank- ruptcy, subject to the statutory right of the husband and wife to continue to hold the land during her life. Ileld, also, that this state statute and the bank- ruptcy act did not exempt from the operation of the bankruptcy the whole ten- ancy by the curtesy for the life of the husband, but only so much as was meas- ured by the life of the wife, and that on lier death, pending the bankruptcy proceedings, the assignee was entitled to take the land for the remainder of the husband's life. Held, further, that there is nothing in the character of the estate of the husband in his wife's lands at common law, nor as modified by this statute, to prevent its passing to the assignee, subject to the statutory exemption during the wife's life, and that neither at commou law nor under the statute was it property acquired by the death of the wife subsequently to the bankruptcy. ��� �
