8AYLES D. L0UI8VILLE CITY R. CO. 515 �the construction now given. See Sayles v. L. S. e M. S. R. Co., Justice Harlan, MS. op.;* Sayles v. D. e S. C. R. Co., Ju(jLges Dillon & Love, MS. op. contra; j: Judge Hughes, 3 Hughes, 172. �I therefore consider that the six years' limitation, as pleaded, is a bar to plaintiff's recoyery of damages for the infringement of tHe origi- nal term of his patent, and that he can only recover damages for his extended term — from July, 1866, to July, 1873. Let judgment go for $393, which is the sum agreed upon by the parties if the plea of the statuts was sustained as to the original term of the patent. �*Satles v. JjAKe Shobe & MicmaAN Southern Et. Co. �Samb v. Chicago & Northwestern Ey. OO. �Same v. CHXOAao, Burlington & Quincy Ky. Co. �{Uircuii Court, 2f. D. IlUnoia. October Term, 1879.) �, In Chancery. �EXTBAOT of DECISION OF JUSTICE HARLAN ON DEMUBRER TO BILI» �The third ground of demurrer is a question of limitation under the act of 1870. The act of 1870 coutains this short provision : "Ail actions shall be brought during the term for which the letters patent shall be granted or ex- tended, or within six years after the expiration thereof." �I am not referred by counsel on either side to any adjudication bearing direotly upon the question. It is a question within a very small and narrow compass, and must be determined by a fair and reasonable construction of the Linguage. I have reached a conclusion entirely satisfactory to my own mind, and I thlnk that statute means that where the party sues for any infringement under the original term, he must bring his action within six years after the expiration of that term ; and when he sues for anything that has occurred under the extended term, he must sue within six years after the expiration of that extension; and that the statute does not mean, as contended for by the learned counsel for the complainant, that the party has the right to sue for an in- fringement, either under the original or extended term, within six years after the expiration of the extended term, and thus bring the suit within 27 years. I do not think that was the purpose of congress, and I therefore sustain the grounds of demurrer as to all causes of action. �Mr. Walker, interruptingthe court in the delivery of its opinion, said : �" In the case of Sloan v. Watterson the supreme court of the United StateS; in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Bradley, held that statutes of limita tion began to run as to rights of action that accrued prior to their passage, not at the time they accrued, but at the tirae the act was passed ; so that, inasmuch as this statute of limitations was enaeted in July, 1870, the case of Sloan v. Watterson will cause your honor to conclude, I think, that we had six years from the time it was enaeted in which to bring our suits, and inasmuch as we brought our suits within six years from the time it was enaeted, these suits, eveu as far as they refer to the rights of action under the flrst term, are not ��� �
