59O FEDERAL REPORTER. �Hawkins estate. We must, therefore, look for some other rule for our guidance. The money was paid by Branson and Love, who were not liable upon either judgmeiit. The payment was, therefore, not made by them because of any personal liability on the part of either of them. Why, then, did they pay it ? Evidently, for the reason that the judgment of appellant against the bankrupt was a lien upon the proceeds of the sale of the Hawkins land on a par with their own judgments, and the appellant was, therefore, entitled to share with them in those proceeds. While, therefore, the payment was not made in a strict and teohnical sense upon the judgment against the bankrupt, it was clearly made because of that judgment, and on account of the fact that it was a lien. Of course, if appellant had held no judgment against Hawkins except the one whioh was junior to those of Branson and Love, they would have paid nothing. It was the existence and priority of the judgment against the bank- rupt a;ud the Hawkins estate that made the payment necessary. The ?|,p>pellant used that judgment to enforee payment, and, having done 80, undertook to apply the payment, when made, upon another and junior judgment, which could not have been used to secure or enforee the payment. �This is not a case for the application of the rule that, where a debtor pays a sum of money to his creditor, the two may agree that it shall be applied to either of several debts. The relation of debtor and creditor did not exist between appellant and Branson and Love. These three parties, Seay, Branson, and Love, each held a judgment which was entitled to share in the fund raised by the sale of the Haw- kins estate. The two latter paid the former $450, to release his claim under his judgment against said fund. This amounted to an enforcement of his judgment lien against said fund to that extent. The appellant cannot, as against the other creditors of the bankrupt, be placed in a better position than he would have occupied if he had made no bargain with Branson and Love, and had insisted upon and received the share in the fund to which his judgment entitled him; and if he had done that, no one will question that it would have been his duty to credit what he received on the claim which was enforced, to-wit, the judgment against the bankrupt. By a sort of indirect or eircuitous arrangement with the other lienholders, he bas, in effect, enforced his judgment lien to the extent of $450. The assignee of the bankrupt, acting for the creditors, haa a right to insist that the credit shall be entered, just as if the enforcement of the lien had beeu direct instead of indirect. The rule, then, by which we are to be ��� �
