THE BOBEST QASKIN. 63 �of diligence. I fiee ilo reason to doubt that, if an att'aohnient had been promptly takett-olltin the springof 18Ti,ihe vesSelwould have been seized befoire the close of lidVigation. In 1876 sbe yisited Bay City, and libellant there demanded bis bill. Then, certaiuly, if not before, it was'his duty to 'aet. It is true be might not have been able to seize ber before leaving Bay City, but if bebad forwarded bis claim at once to Detfoit, an attacbment migbt have been issued, and the brig seized dri lier down trip'.' ' �It is insisted.however, that the fact that the libel was filed before the Sale was made to' the preseui o'w'ners is sufEcieni evidence of diligence. It is Bfot pesrceived how the owners are placed ih any bet- ter piosition b;f this fact than they would have been if the libel had been' filed after the oialo. The fact that the libel was filed five montbs before the sale, cari only be niaterial upou the theory that the filing of the libel and the isenirig oif the' attachirient were constractive notice ei flaie pendency of the suit. There isno-doubt that in cases affecting real property the commencement of a suit is constructive notice of tixe pendente lite. Wade, Law of Notice, e. 2, § 5; County of War- rerii.Mariiy, 97 TJ. 8:107. �It is duubtful, to say the least, whether the commencement of a suit to enfonce a lien lipori a vessel is such a suit as is within the contemplation of this rule. But, waiving this question, it is quite evident that the suit was not commenced at the time the sale was made in such a way as to bind honajide purchasers of the property, without actual notice. For the purpose of ascertaining whether a suit is brought within the statutory limitation, the suit is generally held to be commenced from the date the process is issued and placed in the hands of an ofScer for service; but in other cases, where the question as to the validity of a purcbase depends upon whether the property purchased is the subject of litigation at the time, the suit will not be regarded as pending until the service of original process, whether the same is personally served upon the defendant, or by any method prescribed by statute as a substitute for personal service. Wade, Law of Notice, § 348. �Now, as it is clear in this case that the process was not served upon the vessel until three months after the sale, the suit cannot be regarded as baving been liommenced until that time. The crediter of a vessel is bound, as against a honafide purcbaser, to use due dil- igence ; and I know of nothing but the continued absence of the ves- sel from the reach of process which will excuse him. He bas no ��� �
