HUDSON V. KAN8AS PACIFIC EY. CO. 881 �That defendant should accept the coupon for travel over its own Une implies only that it was sold by its authority. But if that was the limit of authority in the company selling the ticket, why should de- fendant assume responsibility in respect to the remainder of the journey over the Eio Grande line? As to tickets of this class, de- fendant not only performed the part assigned to it in the original contract by carrying the passenger from Kansas City to Denver,but also protected the remainder of the ticket byfurnishing a local ticket to destination, or.paying the money which would procure it, A fair inference from such oonduct may be that the ticket was originally sold by its authority. And if sold by defendant's authority, and the Eio Grande Company refused to carry the passenger according to its terms, the defendant was clearly liable to some one for the value of the ticket. It must ofton happen in the effort to draw travel over its Unes which vrould otherwise go to a rival, that a railroad com- pany will assume the burden of carrying a passenger beyond its own terminus, and in such case there would seem to be nothing in reason or authority to exempt it from liability on its contract. �It is conceded that a railroad company may contract to carry a passenger any distance, provided its own line be a part of the jour- ney. And whether the part owned by the contracting company be the first or the last, or from the middle, must be wholly immaterial. The principle is, that, in promoting its own business, a railroad com- pany may make any contract which it may have capacity to perform in some part, although not the whole, and the exact part, whether great or small, cannot be material. �The objection that a contract for transportation over a railroad is not assignable by a passenger, if correct in princit)le, doea not meet the case. The evidence shows that the Eio Grande Company did not accept the tickets, and it must have been known to defend- ant, when they were sold, that they would not be honored. The fact that other tickets bought of the Eio Grande Company were given in lieu of them, or that money was paid for them at the option of the holder, admits of no other construction. The truth appears to be that the tickets were not sold to be used on the Eio Grande road according to their terms, and could not be so used. How, then, shall we say that the purchaser was bound to ride in person, when he was not allowed to ride either in person or by another, or in any way. If he has no remedy in damages, it would seem that he is without remedy. �v.9,no.l5— 56 ��� �
