ated, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the People could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said, that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing; because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the People into submission, would find resources in that very force, sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the Legislature. But the question again recurs: upon what pretence could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary, as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion, or resist an invasion; and if the defence of the community, under such circumstances, should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of Government: it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defence.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state: nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if
