in this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from the whole is—that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper, that this concurrent jurisdiction in the Article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 4, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. XXXII.
To the People of the State of New York:
I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number, that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have coequal authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion, that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired, for the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently wide, will more fully appear, when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses, for which it will fall to the lot of the State Governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles, that this coördi-
