States as evidence of the will of a majority of the People of the United States. Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a Fœderal, and not a National Constitution.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of Government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the People of America; and the People will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the Legislature of a particular State. So far the Government is National, not Fœderal. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the Government is Fœderal, not National. The Executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the Legislature which consists of the National representatives; but in this particular act, they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the Government, it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many Fœderal as National features.
The difference between a Fœderal and National Government, as it relates to the operation of the Government,
