vote in case of a tie. The Executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the Legislative department; and his Council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of State are also appointed by the Legislature. And the members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Executive department.
The Constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental Article of liberty. It declares, "that the Legislative department shall never exercise the Executive and Judicial powers, or either of them: the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative and Judicial powers, or either of them: the Judicial shall never exercise the Legislative and Executive powers, or either of them." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the Convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The Executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the Legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the Legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the Executive and Judiciary departments. The members of the Judiciary department, again, are appointable by the Executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two Legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of Government are annually appointed by the Legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly Executive offices, is in its nature an Executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves.
