to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the People in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great National questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient Government; and whilst no spirit of party, connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the Government. We have seen that the tendency of republican Governments is to an aggrandizement of the Legislative, at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the People, therefore, would usually be made by the Executive and Judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the Executive and Judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the People. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the People to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy; and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the Legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the People at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most
