ure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the coöperation of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 15, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. LIV.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the Fœderal Legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any Article indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character, and the apparent force of argument, with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of Representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citi-
