the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a Representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants, will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.]
THE FŒDERALIST. No. LVI.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the Fœderal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican Government.
The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and, in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers, is the characteristic policy of republican Government. The means relied on in this form of Government for preventing their de-
