the most important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election.
I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that the interests of each State, to be represented in the Fœderal Councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the State Legislatures. But the security will not be considered as complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The People of America may be warmly attached to the Government of the Union, at times when the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the People, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the States at the present moment, on the present question. The scheme of separate Confederacies, which will always multiply the chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations, as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the National Government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the People, (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited,) to discontinue the choice of members for the Fœderal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm
