hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the People, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted Senate?
A good Government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of Government, which is the happiness of the People; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some Governments are deficient in both these qualities; most Governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American Governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The Fœderal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the Government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the Representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in National transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable Government, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
