of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the Fœderal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland Constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union.
But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary Assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the People, is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the People. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the Anti-Fœderal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary Assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual Representatives of the People, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life; continually gained on its authority; and finally drew all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the Representatives of the People, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate
