right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and Judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.
It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the Constitution of this State; while that Constitution makes the Senate, together with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of Impeachments, but the highest Judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the Senators, is so inconsiderable, that the Judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the Convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the Constitution of New York?[1]
A second objection to the Senate, as a Court of Impeachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the Government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of
- ↑ In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the Legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, one branch of the Legislature is the Court for the trial of impeachments.—Publius.
