lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the People; secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive, and a numerous Legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the People, and to secure their privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy, will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates, of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and coöperation of others, in the capacity of Counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the Constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the Executive authority wholly to single men.[1] Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an Executive Council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar
- ↑ New York has no Council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a Council whom the Governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the Constitution, their resolutions do not bind him.—Publius.
