it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the Convention. From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them would be too apt in interpreting them; still less could it be expected, that men who had infringed the Constitution, in the character of Legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in the character of Judges. Nor is this all; every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for Judicial offices, militates against placing the Judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the first instance, to Judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men, who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the Legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of Judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear, that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides, will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States, who have committed the Judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the Legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to
