United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of matters of National jurisdiction within its limits.
But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been accomplished by the instrumentality of the State Courts? This admits of different answers. Though the fitness and competency of those Courts should be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the substance of the power in question may still be regarded as a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to empower the National Legislature to commit to them the cognizance of causes arising out of the National Constitution. To confer the power of determining such causes upon the existing Courts of the several States, would perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals," as to create new Courts with the like power. But ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have been made in favor of the State Courts? There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision: the most discerning cannot foresee, how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of National causes; whilst every man may discover, that Courts constituted like those of some of the States would be improper channels of the Judicial authority of the Union. State Judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the National laws. And if there was a necessity for confiding the original cognizance of causes arising under those laws to them, there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of the subordinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety of the appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes to which it is extended by the plan of the Convention,
