of additional expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution, are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a Government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FŒDERALIST.] No. LXXXV.
[To the People of the State of New York:]
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion, two points,—"the analogy of the proposed Government to your own State Constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican Government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do anything more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said; which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the Convention to the Act which organizes the Government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects, are the re-eligibility of the Executive; the want of a Council; the
