tion IV. and V., by which matter per se and the material qualities per se are reduced to the contradictory or absurd.
The propositions and counter-propositions fall into groups.11. At this place it is proper to remark that, although a close connection subsists among all the propositions on the one hand, and all the counter-propositions on the other hand, still there is a stricter affinity among some of them than among others. They fall naturally into groups; and the system has periodical resting-places where it pauses for a moment, and from whence it again flows forward with an accession of strength. One of these pauses occurs at the end of Proposition V. The first five propositions, and their corresponding counter-propositions, are to be regarded as forming a group or family which, although closely related to those which follow, are still more closely related to each other. The groups into which the subsequent propositions and counter-propositions fall shall be indicated as we proceed.
The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects.12. The error brought to light in Counter-proposition VI. is the supposition that the knowledge of particular things can precede the knowledge of universals, or rather of a universal (the me). If this counter-proposition were true, the refutation of the preceding counter-propositions would, of course, go for nothing, and materialism would be triumphant.