permitted to maintain its place, almost without challenge, in all our schools of philosophy down to the present hour; so completely has psychological science in general taken the colour and imbibed the spirit of physical research.
" Ut multis nota est naturæ causa latentis;
At sua qui noscat pectora rarus adest"
It is time, however, that this substance, and the doctrines and facts taught in connection with it, were tested in a more rigorous and critical spirit, not, indeed, upon their own account, but on account of those greater and more important truths whose places they have usurped. How, then, do we propose testing this substance? In this way. The word "mind" is exceedingly remote and ambiguous, and denotes—nobody knows what. Let us then substitute in place of it that much plainer expression which everybody makes use of, and in some degree, at least, understands—the expression "I" or "me;" and let us see how mind, with its facts and doctrines, will fare when this simple, unpretending, and unhypothetical word is employed in its place.
"External objects take effect upon mind, and perception is the result." This doctrine lies at the very threshold of our ordinary metaphysics, and forms the foundation-stone upon which their whole superstructure is erected. But is it true? Let us come to a more distinct understanding of it by changing it into the following statement, and we shall see what gross though deep-lurking falsities are brought to light by
