crimination, no act of any kind, is involved in sensation; therefore man might continue to undergo sensations until doomsday without ever becoming "I," and without ever perceiving an external[1] universe.
How then does man become "I"? how does he become percipient of an external universe? We answer, Not through sensation, but by and through an act of discrimination, or virtual negation. This negation is not, and need not be, expressed in words. It is a silent but deep deed, making each man an individual person; and it is enough if the reality of it be present, even although the expression and distinct conception of it should be absent. But if the reality were actually absent, then there would be a difference indeed. If "no," in thought and in deed, were taken out of the world, man would never become "I," and, for him, the external universe would remain a nonentity. Sensation, passion, &c., would continue as strong and violent as ever, but consciousness would depart; man and nature, "I" and "not I,"
- ↑ The statement that we become acquainted with the existence of an external world through, and in consequence of, our sensations, besides its falsehood, embodies perhaps the boldest petitio principii upon record. How are we assured of the reality of an external world? asks the philosophy of scepticism. Through the senses, answers the philosophy of faith. But are not the senses themselves a part of the external universe? and is not this answer, therefore, equivalent to saying that we become assured of the reality of the external universe through the external universe? or, in other words, is not this solution of the question a direct taking-for-granted of the very matter in dispute? It may be frivolous to raise such a question, but it is certainly far more frivolous to resolve it in this manner, the manner usually practised by our Scottish philosophers.
