given fact; for, as we have said, our apprehension of, or participation in, the perception of matter, this is the whole given fact); but the perception of matter is the whole objective part of the given fact. But it will perhaps be asked, Are there not here two given facts? Does not the perception of matter imply two data? Is not the perception one given fact, and is not the matter itself another given fact, and are not these two facts perfectly distinct from one another? No; it is the false analysis of psychologists which we have already exposed that deceives us. But there is another circumstance which perhaps contributes more than anything else to assist and perpetuate our delusion. This is the construction of language. We shall take this opportunity to put the student of philosophy upon his guard against its misleading tendency.
People imagine that because two (or rather three) words are employed to denote the fact (the perception of matter), that therefore there are two separate facts and thoughts corresponding to these separate words. But it is a great mistake to suppose that the analysis of facts and thoughts necessarily runs parallel with the analysis of sounds. Man, as Homer says, is μέροψ, or a word-divider; and he often carries this propensity so far as to divide words where there is no corresponding division of thoughts or of things. This is a very convenient practice in so far as the ordinary business of life is concerned, for it
