pied by the Ionic philosophers, we shall perceive that it is an advance, an ascent, to some extent at least, from sense to reason. In fact, the great distinction between sense and reason is now beginning to declare itself. To revert for a few moments to the Ionic philosophy. This philosophy is an advance on ordinary thinking; ordinary thinking is held captive by the senses. It accepts their data implicitly, or without question. In the estimation of ordinary thinking, things are precisely as they appear: and their diversity is more attended to than their unity. In a word, ordinary thinking has eyes only for the particular, and is blind, or nearly so, to the universal. The Ionic philosophy rose into a higher position. It aimed at unity: it sought for a universal amid the diversity of sensible things; and this was an advance, a step in the right direction. The Ionic philosophy stood on a platform somewhat higher than that of ordinary thinking. But still this platform is far from being the platform of reason. The unity which the Ionic philosophers sought for among sensible things was sought for by means, and under the direction, of sense itself. It was a mere sensible universal; water, or infinite matter, or air; in short, it was something in itself material, and therefore something which, instead of being itself the universal in all things, did itself require to be brought under a universal, or reduced to unity under a higher principle. It was, in fact, a particular universal, in other words, a contradiction. The Ionic school, we may say, never rose
