Page:FitzGerald Report-Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon-S2005203.pdf/5

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by acute polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and the failure of the Lebanese State to provide adequate protection for its citizens.

The political context

6. Lebanon has repeatedly served as a battleground for the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with devastating impact on its national unity and independence, as demonstrated by its tragic civil war (1975-1990) and by various military campaigns on its soil. The Syrian Arab Republic had maintained a military presence in Lebanon since May 1976 with the consent of the Lebanese Government. It also exerted political influence in Lebanese affairs, an influence that has significantly increased since 1990 and was sanctioned in 1991 by a treaty of "Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination".

7. The Syrian presence in Lebanon remained generally unchallenged until Israel withdrew its forces from South Lebanon in 2000. Political figures started to voice their opposition to the continued Syrian influence and called for the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Taif Agreement (of 1989), which, if implemented, would have substantially reduced the Syrian presence in Lebanon to a possible complete pull-out. Although Mr. Hariri carefully avoided this debate, his relations with President Emil Lahoud, who is generally described as the favourite of the Syrian Arab Republic, were strained. As a prominent security official close to the Syrian Arab Republic put it to the Mission, the two men had had repeated conflicts during Mr. Hariri’s term (2000-2004) to a point that required "external intervention and mediation on a daily basis". The conflict between Mr. Lahoud and Mr. Hariri affected the latter’s ability to run the Government and to carry out his policies, sometimes to the point of paralysis. Mr. Hariri’s difficulties with Mr. Lahoud were widely interpreted as a sign of the Syrian Arab Republic’s mistrust of the former.

8. Mr. Lahoud’s term in office should have ended in 2004, with no possibility of renewal according to the Constitution. Mr. Hariri was clearly hoping that the end of Mr. Lahoud’s term would enable him to regain control over his Government. However, during 2004, certain voices in Lebanon suggested amending the Constitution in order to extend the term of Mr. Lahoud. This possibility became part of the debate over the Syrian presence in Lebanon and fuelled it further. Given the distribution of seats in the Parliament, a constitutional amendment required the support of Mr. Hariri’s bloc, a support he was unprepared to lend. Moreover, the Mission was informed by reliable sources that Mr. Hariri had managed to obtain a commitment from the Syrian leadership not to extend Mr. Lahoud’s term.

9. However, the Syrian leadership later decided to support an extension of the presidential term, albeit for three instead of six years. The pressure for the extension was considerable and divisive and had far-reaching consequences. As a Lebanese official close to the Syrian leadership told the Mission, the Syrian decision had sent a clear message to Mr. Hariri that he had to go: "There was no way the two of them could work together." Mr. Hariri met with President Bashar Assad in Damascus in a last attempt to convince him not to support the extension. The Mission has received accounts of this meeting from various sources inside and outside Lebanon, all of which claim to have heard the account of the meeting from Mr. Hariri himself shortly after the meeting took place. The Mission has no account of the meeting from Mr. Assad’s side: the Syrian authorities declined the Mission’s request to meet with him. The received testimonies corroborated each other almost verbatim.