Lebanon, told the Mission that Mr. Hariri and Mr. Jumblatt had feared for their lives and saw the attempt on Mr. Hemadeh’s life as a part of the ongoing power struggle with the Syrian leadership.
14. Amid the heightened tension, the consolidation of the opposition coalition continued, as well as the preparations for the upcoming legislative elections. Contacts and negotiations took place between Mr. Jumblatt and Mr. Hariri and with the exiled Maronite leader Mr. Michel Aoun. By the end of January 2005, there was a formidable power bloc emerging in Lebanon, bringing together, for the first time, representatives of almost all political and religious communities, with the noted exception of the Shi`ite groups Amal and Hizbollah. This power bloc was independent from, if not hostile to, the Syrian influence and seemed confident of winning a clear majority in the upcoming elections. It also enjoyed the support of key players in the international community and seemed confident of its ability to force the Syrian Arab Republic to implement its outstanding commitment under the Taif Agreement and/or Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). At the centre of this power bloc one man stood as its perceived architect: the former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. On 14 February, he was assassinated.
15. Clearly, Mr. Hariri’s assassination took place against the backdrop of his power struggle with the Syrian Arab Republic, regardless of who carried out the assassination and with what aim. It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that only a proper investigation — not political analysis — could lead to the identification of those who had ordered, planned and carried out this heinous crime. It would be a violation of the basic principles of justice to jump to conclusions about the perpetrators of the assassination without proper investigation, convincing evidence and a proper trial.
The security background
16. Mr. Hariri was unanimously described to the Mission as the "most important figure in Lebanese public life". His assassination, therefore, begs the question of the level of protection provided to him by the Lebanese security apparatus. The Lebanese security system is composed of multiple agencies. The Military Intelligence occupies a primary position in this set-up: it covers areas of national security, counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and a strike force. It also includes a department for communications interception. "General Security" covers areas related to foreigners, passports and borders, in addition to politically based security issues. An "Internal Security Force" includes both a police force and an information-gathering department. "State Security" is nominally responsible for politically based security issues. The Republican Guard is mandated with protecting the President, under the overall authority of the commander of the Army. The Syrian Military Intelligence maintains a branch in Lebanon, with offices in various places including Beirut. Contrary to the affirmations made to the Mission by its chief, evidence and concurrent testimonies lead us to believe beyond reasonable doubt that this branch played a key role in Lebanese political life and had an active involvement in, if not direct supervision of, the management of security affairs in Lebanon.
17. According to rules and regulations in place, these different agencies coordinate with each other and are all members of a Central Security Council which meets once a month under the Chairpersonship of the Minister of the Interior. However,
