grounds: First, however necessary may, as I have already pointed out, be, for Mr. Spencer, the elaboration of a Ghost-theory in order to account, if possible, for a conception of the animation of Nature, which he admits to be actual, but denies to be primordial, there is, as I have also already pointed out, no such necessity for Dr. Tylor's theory of Animism. But setting this aside, I must remark, secondly, that, as we have absolutely no evidence whatever of a spontaneous origin of Civilisation among Savages, so we have absolutely no evidence whatever of the spontaneous origin of such a reasoned inductive and deductive Philosophy among Savages, as is attributed to them by Dr. Tylor, as also by Mr. Spencer. Thirdly, the undeveloped mental capacities of Savages, which have been by no one more clearly demonstrated than by Mr. Spencer—the utter absence, or extreme defect, among them of capacities of surprise and curiosity, of abstraction, and of deliberate and coherent thought—make impossible the elaboration of such a complex and consistent theory as is attributed to them by Dr. Tylor's theory of Animism, as also, in contradiction of his own principles,[1] by Mr. Spencer himself in his Ghost-theory. Fourthly, while there would be at least
- ↑ Thus, for instance, Mr. Spencer truly says, Principles of Sociology, i: "Conditioned as he is, the savage lacks abstract ideas" (p. 74). "An invisible, intangible entity . . . is a high abstraction unthinkable by Primitive Man, and inexpressible by his vocabulary" (p. 133). "'Plants are green', or 'Animals grow', are propositions never definitely formed in his consciousness, because he has no idea of a plant or animal apart from kind" (p. 83). "In proportion as the mental energies go out in restless perception they cannot go out in deliberate thought" (p. 77). "Absence of the idea of natural causation implies absence of rational surprise" (p. 85). "When the Abipones are unable to comprehend anything at first sight, they soon grow weary of examining it, and cry, 'What is it after all?'" (p. 53). And after citing a number of similar facts, Mr. Spencer truly says: "The general fact thus exemplified is one quite at variance with current ideas respecting the thoughts of Primitive Man. He is commonly pictured as theorizing about surrounding appearances; whereas, in fact, the need for explanations of them does not occur to him" (p. 87).
