Page:Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 Volume 1 Part 2.djvu/24

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514
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1948, VOLUME I

2. The time factor and the question of amount.

The dilatoriness of the Congress in acting on this matter presents a definite danger to the success of the program. A gap between the date on which the aid becomes available and the point to which European reserves can hold out could nullify a great part of the effect of the program.

There is probably not much that we can do, by pleading or urging, to expedite Congressional action. But I think we should state very plainly to Congress the time limits involved (which our own economic analysts must determine) and the possible consequences of delay. Furthermore, we should make clear that aid granted subsequent to the specified time limits cannot be considered as a response to the recommendations of the Executive branch of the Government, and that the latter cannot take responsibility for the desirability or effectiveness of the program in these circumstances.

The same principle applies in case the program is cut in amount below what we consider to be the minimum necessary for the recovery purpose.

In either case, there will be charges we are trying to "dictate" to the Congress. But there is a serious question of responsibility involved here; and the Executive branch of the Government will find itself embarrassed in its future position if it allows itself to be forced now into accepting a share of responsibility for a program of aid which it knows will be too little, too late, or both.

3. The question of European Union.

The original reaction to the Harvard speech,[1] both in Europe and here, demonstrated how vitally important to the success of an aid program is the concept of European unity. Unless the program actually operates to bring closer together the countries participating in it, it will certainly fail in its major purpose, and it will not take on, in the eyes of the world public, the dignity and significance which would set it apart from the previous efforts at foreign economy aid.

There is real danger that this basic fact be lost sight of at this stage in the deliberations, not only in the Congress, but also in the Department.

We should therefore make it a point to lose no opportunity to stress this element in the concept of the aid program, and to insist that the principle of collaboration and joint responsibility among the 16 nations be emphasized throughout in our handling of the operation.


  1. For text of Secretary Marshall's address at commencement exercises at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, p. 237, or Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947, p. 1159.