tain concepts represents the whole of reality do not suffice to prove that one is actually dealing with real and concrete things. It is easy enough to give a name to a thing, but it remains to be seen whether the thing really possesses the characteristics indicated by the name. I may affirm that The Tempest is a historical comedy: but that affirmation does not turn Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban into historical characters. The Hegelians have too much faith in the magic power of the word; and when they have filled their mouths with those words which most readily inspire the confidence of the populace (real, concrete, true, etc.), they really think that they have bestowed upon their theories the qualities which those words indicate. In this respect the Hegelians are very like the positivists. What a mass of absurd theses and superficial generalizations people have been made to swallow without question, just because they were labeled positive, scientific, or mathematical!
But I am forgetting my purpose, which consists not so much in attempting a criticism of the Hegelian dialectic—which would hardly be possible save for those who are ready to deal in majestic and confused phrases and to fabricate rebuses of the same sort—as in attempting to discover in it some reasonable meaning. By way of making amends for my delay, I will be generous: instead of suggesting one meaning I will
