study of such problems; indeed, I have studied them myself. But there are only two methods by which they may be studied to advantage: by the collection of data, carefully observed, controlled, and tested; or by the formation of new and specific hypotheses with regard to the causes and varieties of these data. But Maeterlinck follows neither of these methods. He does nothing that is really useful either to science or to thought. He does not adduce a single new fact: once in a while he cites a fact that is perfectly familiar. As to theory, he gives way unashamed to the vagaries of his incurable ambiguity.
He seems to want to believe in a mysterious second soul within us, the reflection of a hidden universal soul; but at the same time he advances the arguments of a pettifogging materialist. He finds some good in the beliefs of spiritism; but he seeks to disregard them as far as possible. He does not scorn theosophy; but he avoids it, and lumps it with all other religions. He is religious; but he recognizes no authority save that of science. He tries to give himself the air of a scientist; but he loses himself in a sea of vague sophistication. You do not know whether he believes in mediums, in general telepathy, or in the intervention of spirits. He would like to believe, but he is afraid to believe; and with all his scruples and reservations, with all his hypocritical attempts at objectivity, he ends with
