Thomas, J., dissenting
such as a “‘short selling’ scheme,” a wash sale, a matched order, price rigging, or similar conduct. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 770, 778 (1979) (applying §17(a)(1)); see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 473 (1977) (interpreting the term “manipulative” in §10(b)).
Here, it is undisputed that Lorenzo did not engage in any conduct involving planning, scheming, designing, or strategizing, as Rule 10b–5(a) and §17(a)(1) require for a primary violation. He sent two e-mails drafted by a superior, to recipients specified by the superior, pursuant to instructions given by the superior, without collaborating on the substance of the e-mails or otherwise playing an independent role in perpetrating a fraud. That Lorenzo knew the messages contained falsities does not change the essentially administrative nature of his conduct here; he might have assisted in a scheme, but he did not himself plan, scheme, design, or strategize. In my view, the plain text of Rule 10b–5(a) and §17(a)(1) thus does not encompass Lorenzo’s conduct as a matter of primary liability.
The remaining provision, Rule 10b–5(c), seems broader at first blush. But the scope of this conduct-based provision—and, for that matter, Rule 10b–5(a) and §17(a)(1)—must be understood in light of its codification alongside a prohibition specifically addressing primary liability for false statements. Rule 10b–5(b) imposes primary liability on the “make[r]” of a fraudulent misstatement. 17 CFR §240.10b–5(b); see Janus, 564 U. S., at 141–142. And §17(a)(2) imposes primary liability on a person who “obtain[s] money or property by means of” a false statement. 15 U. S. C. §77q(a)(2). The conduct-based provisions of Rules 10b–5(a) and (c) and §17(a)(1) must be interpreted in view of the specificity of these false-statement provisions, and therefore cannot be construed to encompass primary liability solely for false statements. This view is consistent with our previous
