charged on both sides to boot. Because the risk of making bad law in these circumstances is particularly high, we should aim to decide as narrowly as we can, leaving the task of crafting broad new rules for a case in which it is actually necessary to do so. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 916 (2006).
Had we chosen to decide narrowly here, we could have affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction by focusing solely on the irreparable harm prong. Garcia bore the burden of showing that "irreparable injury is likely in the absence of" the requested injunction. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The only form of injury Garcia has alleged that could qualify as irreparable is the risk of death she faces as a result of the fatwa issued against her. Unlike the majority, I'm willing to assume that the risk of death qualifies as irreparable injury in this context. But under our decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011), Garcia also had to prove a "causal connection" between the irreparable injury she faces and the conduct she hopes to enjoin. Id. at 982. In other words, she had to show that removing the film from YouTube would likely eliminate (or at least materially reduce) the risk of death posed by issuance of the fatwa.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding, albeit for reasons different from those I offer here, that Garcia failed to satisfy the irreparable harm prong. The sad but unfortunate truth is that the threat posed to Garcia by issuance of the fatwa will remain whether The Innocence of Muslims is available on YouTube or not. Garcia is subject to the fatwa because of her role in making the film, not because the film is available on YouTube. The film will undoubtedly remain accessible on the Internet for all who
