Mencius replied, “Do you mean that there is such a thing as nature in the abstract, just as there is whiteness in the abstract?”
“I do,” answered Kao Tzŭ.
“Just, for instance,” continued Mencius, “as the whiteness of a feather is the same as the whiteness of snow, or the whiteness of snow as the whiteness of jade?”
“I do,” answered Kao Tzŭ again.
“In that case,” retorted Mencius, “the nature of a dog is the same as that of an ox, and the nature of an ox the same as that of a man.”
Kao Tzŭ said, “Eating and reproduction of the species are natural instincts. Charity is subjective and innate; duty towards one’s neighbour is objective and acquired. For instance, there is a man who is my senior, and I defer to him as such. Not because any abstract principle of seniority exists subjectively in me, but in the same way that if I see a white man I recognise him as such, because he is so objectively to me. Consequently, I say that that duty towards one’s neighbour is objective or acquired.”
Mencius replied, “The cases are not analogous. The whiteness of a white horse is undoubtedly the same as the whiteness of a white man; but the seniority of a horse is not the same as the seniority of a man. Does our duty to our senior begin and end with the fact of his seniority? Or does it not rather consist in the necessity of deferring to him as such?”
Kao Tzŭ said, “I love my own brother; but I do not love another man's brother. The distinction arises from within myself; therefore I call it subjective or innate. But I defer to a stranger who is my senior just as I defer to a senior among my own people. The distinction comes to me from without; therefore I call it objective or acquired.”
Mencius retorted, “We enjoy food cooked by strangers just as much as food cooked by our own people. Yet extension of your principle lands us in the conclusion that our appreciation of cooked food is also objective and acquired.”
