bar. Otherwise, the majority has not shown how it can be said that the material in the case at bar is obscene and therefore not protected by the First Amendment, notwithstanding what the U. S. Supreme Court has said in the Jacobellis case.
In view of the fact that undoubtedly this case will go to the U. S. Supreme Court for a final decision, I see no point in elaborating on the construction placed on the First Amendment by the majority of our court, which is contrary to the construction of the Amendment by the U. S. Supreme Court in many cases, including Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, et al., 355 U. S. 35; One, Inc. v. Olesen, Postmaster of Los Angeles, 355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, Postmaster General, 355 U. S. 372; Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 U. S. 684; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, Postmaster General, 370 U. S. 478.
All of the foregoing cases are directly in point with the case at bar. There was a conviction in each case of violating some statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material. In each case the alleged obscenity involved was lewd, lascivious, and perhaps shocking. In each case the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The majority has made no attempt whatever to distinguish the alleged obscene material in the case at bar from the material that was in issue in the foregoing cases. There is no effort to show that the material involved here is any more obscene than the material that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by the First Amendment.
In my opinion the decision in this case will be reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice George Rose Smith joins in this dissent.
