to ends, just as much as a man who runs to secure a snared bird, or who builds a "golden bridge" for a flying enemy? I think that Professor Romanes would have designated the actions of the spider as instinctive, and the actions of the man as rational. Yet, in what respect do they differ? Only in that the actions of the spider result from knowledge which is inborn and inherited, whereas the actions of the man result from knowledge which is neither inborn nor transmissible, but has been acquired. Again, in what particular does the action of the young alligator, that seeks the water and snaps at an opposing walking-stick, differ from the actions of the man who seeks a refuge and strikes at an intervening enemy? Only, I think, in that the one acts by virtue of inborn transmitted knowledge, whereas the other acts by virtue of acquired, non-transmissible knowledge. If we take the words "exercised in adaption to circumstances, novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species," as separating that which is instinctive from that which is rational, by what term shall we designate the action of a man who speaks, or even of one who builds a hut, actions novel neither to the experience of the individual nor to that of the species? Wherein do such actions differ from those of a bird, which utters cries of rage or fear or warning, or which builds a nest? Once again, only, in that the man acts by virtue of acquired, non-inherited knowledge, whereas the bird acts by virtue of knowledge which is inborn and inherited.
In very low animals, such as the cœlenterates, almost all actions are apparently reflex. Higher in the scale reflex action becomes manifestly associated with instinct. Higher yet, reflex action and instinct become associated with reason. But though reflex action and instinct successively lose their positions of commanding importance
