fast as Instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent ."—Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 434–5.
It seems, therefore, that he regards consciousness as an accidental accompaniment of instinct (and presumably of reason also), not as an essential part of it. But some instinctive (and rational[1] actions which result from consciousness, such as winking the eye when in fear of injury, are exceedingly simple, whereas some reflex actions, which do not result from consciousness, are highly complex. "No one thinks of sneezing, or the convulsions produced by tickling, as examples of instinctive actions. Yet they are compound reflex actions to a degree of compounding not easily paralleled, and certainly much more so than any of the non-psychical adjustments which are given by Mr. Spencer as illustrations of instinct."[2] So also some rational actions are very simple, whereas some instinctive actions are highly complex—e.g. web-spinning by spiders. Rational action cannot therefore be correctly described as arising out of "instinctive action which has grown too complex to be perfectly instinctive." Moreover, as I say, instinct does not merge into reason, but is sharply divided from it; there is therefore no more cause to suppose, as Mr. Spencer does, that reason arises out of instinct, than for supposing, as Mr. Lewes does, that instinct arises out of reason.
It is to be noted also that instinctive action is as sharply divided from reflex action by the fact that it results from consciousness, as it is divided from rational action by the fact that it is due to inborn, not acquired, knowledge and ways of thinking and acting. Here also
