Thomas, J., dissenting
lieu of applying Strickland’s fact-specific inquiry, thereby departing even further from the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
There are a few problems with these precedents that should cause us to pause before extending them. First, the ineffective-assistance standard apparently originated not in the Sixth Amendment, but in our Due Process Clause jurisprudence. See McMann, supra, at 771, n. 14. Second, “[t]he Constitution, by its terms, does not mandate any particular remedy for violations of its own provisions.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 157 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting); cf. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–5) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not required by the Fourth Amendment). Strickland does not explain how the Constitution requires a new trial for violations of any right to counsel.
Third, our precedents seek to use the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to achieve an end it is not designed to guarantee. The right to counsel is not an assurance of an error-free trial or even a reliable result. It ensures fairness in a single respect: permitting the accused to employ the services of an attorney. The structural protections provided in the Sixth Amendment certainly seek to promote reliable criminal proceedings, but there is no substantive right to a particular level of reliability. In assuming otherwise, our ever-growing right-to-counsel precedents directly conflict with the government’s legitimate interest in the finality of criminal judgments. I would proceed with far more caution than the Court has traditionally demonstrated in this area.
C
The Court should hesitate before further extending our precedents and imposing additional costs on the taxpayers
