His attitude is that the applicant's wish to retain the property is practically not workable, and that if the applicant has lost his faith in him as executor, it was without any foundation.
[17] The second- and third respondents deny that there was a lifelong same-sex partnership because the deceased never mentioned it to his family. They also rely on the opinion on which the first respondent relies. The first respondent assisted them to fill out the forms to give notice of death to the Master. They deny that the deceased and the applicant were lifelong same-sex partners because they could not get married legally and did not go through a marriage ceremony. They contend that even if the deceased and the applicant committed themselves to one another the relationship was not necessarily a marriage but could have been an engagement. They further contend that it is unnecessary to read words into section 1 (1) of the Act as the partners could have entered into a written partnership agreement and could have appointed each other as heirs in wills.
[18] The evidence tendered by the applicant that there was a permanent partnership in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support is convincing and is corroborated in many ways. There was a common home and a joint household. Both parties were involved in the purchase of the house and the renovation thereof. There is no reason not to accept the applicant's evidence why they decided to buy the house in the name of the deceased only. The applicant contributed to the repayment of the bond and the rates and taxes. He also contributed to the purchase of the household necessaries. Moreover it is clear that the relationship was regarded by the parties thereto as a very special relationship. The deceased gave the applicant a wedding band and he told people that it was the ring bought for him by his husband. That they wanted people to know that they were committed to each other in this way is corroborated by a number of witnesses. The arguments by the second- and third respondents, adopted by the first respondent, why that evidence must not be accepted do not in my view detract from the cogency of that evidence. They do not deny the public announcement of commitment. Their argument that the giving of the ring may just as well have been an engagement does not make sense. In the case of heterosexuals an engagement is a mutual promise to get
