freedom to come to a decision as to whether or not they would give their support when the time arose.
I have told the House that on that occasion a General Election was in progress. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned, and an answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do. That was authorized, but on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever a crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later, because that crisis had passed, and the thing had ceased to be of importance—brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. The Agadir crisis—and the Morocco crisis—came, and throughout that I took precisely the same line as had been taken in 1906. Subsequently, in 1912, after a discussion of the situation in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, though it was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations were not binding upon the freedom of either Government.
On November 22, 1912, I wrote the letter to the French Ambassador which I will now read to the House, and received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments:—
"My dear Ambassador,— From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other with armed force. We have agreed that that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency which has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based on an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know
