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Great Speeches of the War
251

committed what has been well called an outrage on the law of nations and a menace to all the smaller nationalities of Europe. [Cheers.]

But it is impossible to consider this question of the violation of Belgian neutrality without giving some consideration to the events which immediately preceded it. We have now before us the evidence of our two Ambassadors, Sir Edward Goschen, of Berlin, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, of Vienna, both of them men of the highest honour and integrity, and the facts are before us. Now after a careful study of these papers I am here to tell you that they leave upon one's mind the irresistible conclusion that this dispute between Austria and Servia, followed by the dispute between Austria and Russia, might have been amicably adjusted but for the sinister influence of German diplomacy. Germany knew all about the demands which Austria was making upon Servia. She concealed these documents, so far as she was able to do so, from the representatives of the other Powers. [Hear, hear.] Germany gave no encouragement to Austria to consider that reply, and then came the moment when our Foreign Minister—[cheers]—to whose conduct in these negotiations I desire to pay my humble tribute—[cheers]—proposed that there should be a conference of the great Powers to endeavour to arrive at an adjustment of the dispute.

Now, how was that proposal received? France accepted it—[Hear, hear]; Russia was ready to discuss it; Italy favoured it; Austria, we know now, was ready to agree to mediation on the two outstanding points. But Germany cavilled at the proposal, and obstructed it at every turn.

At that moment if, as one of the diplomatists so well said, Germany had chosen to touch the button the whole aspect of the controversy would have been changed. [Hear, hear.] And what was it we asked for? Sir Edward Goschen, at the moment when mediation was in sight, asked for a little respite in time. Sir Maurice de Bunsen observed that a few days might, in all probability, have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. But the little respite of time was not allowed, and that was the moment which Germany chose—first, to endeavour to buy us off, and, secondly, to launch a double-barrelled ultimatum, two within three days, with so short a period of grace that from that moment war became inevitable. It was well said by one of the Ministers