Gageler CJ
Gleeson J
Jagot J
15.
seemed that the ultimate conclusion of the trial was to continue as it otherwise would have. Simply put, it seemed inconsequential.'"
A juror, whom we will call juror C, responded to the Sheriff's letter by referring to a male juror having "indicated from the beginning that he did not believe the evidence and that the [appellant] was not guilty on all charges". Juror C did not refer to a juror having conducted internet research or having said anything about internet research.
A juror, whom we will call juror D, responded that he was "not aware of any demonstrated bias, fraud or offence from any person's membership of the jury panel".
A female juror, whom we will call juror E, responded that on "the first occasion the jury entered the jury room together, a male juror announced to the others that he would not find the defendant guilty, regardless of the evidence". While juror E thought this announcement "shocking", it did not bother juror E "enough to contemplate discussions with the judge. It was after all the first morning". The report of juror E's response continued in these terms:
- [Juror E] offers that at no time did she think she should have discussed the male juror's disclosure with the judge, nor does she think she was in breach of her obligations as a member of the jury.
- There were no issues after that. The male juror 'did not indicate any bias and neither did any other panel members'.
- 'This jury member did not follow through on his threat and the final jury verdict is testament to this'."
The "first occasion the jury entered the jury room together", as referred to by juror E, was during the morning of Tuesday, 13 October 2020. The "weekend", as referred to by juror A, was the weekend of 17 and 18 October 2020 before the jury reconvened on Monday, 19 October 2020.
A miscarriage of justice?
The appellant did not contend before this Court that any miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the circumstance that juror X, at the beginning of the trial (that is, before the evidence had been heard), said that he would not convict the appellant. The sole ground of appeal pursued in this Court focused instead on the combination of conduct involving: (a) juror X undertaking internet research about the definitions of and sentences for rape and unlawful carnal knowledge; (b) juror X informing the other members of the jury about this research; and (c) the other members of the jury not informing the trial judge of this conduct of juror X,
