If we had not departed from "the accepted practices of neutrality" for eleven months, to assist Huerta against Carranza, preventing the latter from purchasing arms, there would have been no Tampico flag incident and no Vera Cruz occupation. Huerta would have been driven out before the date of the "insult" to the flag.
If we had not nursed Villa and then abandoned him, it is improbable that there would have been a Columbus raid. The vengeful rage which was, at least in part, the acknowledged motive for the raid, would have been lacking.
If we had held to "the accepted practices of neutrality" from the first, and permitted the unrestricted export of arms and munitions, through the regular channels, to Mexico—as we did to European countries—it is reasonably probable that the most popular Mexican party would long ago have worked out the problem of internal peace, and our most plausible pretext for meddling would now be lacking.
Ever since early in 1913, down to the present writing, the Government headed by Carranza has begged this privilege of the United States, asserting that it was the one thing necessary to put an end to counter-revolution and banditry, and the only thing asked of this country. These appeals have been in vain.
There is no virtue in any theory that the lifting of the embargo would tend to increase Mexican disorder. The present Mexican Government rose to power and maintains itself in spite of the embargo handicap. It holds every sea and land port. It is not in the smuggling business, while its enemies are. Were the embargo raised, there is no reason to believe that the bandits would be able to procure any considerable fraction of the arms imported. Our present policy is still a "departure from the accepted practices of neutrality," in favor of bandits and counter-revolutionists.
Our "punitive expedition" furnished a strange spectacle of a powerful Government invading the territory of a weaker neighbor to alleviate a condition of lawlessness for which it was itself responsible. Having refused Carranza the arms absolutely necessary for the effective policing of the border, we justified our expedition on the ground that Carranza was incapable of effectively policing the border!
Furthermore, having failed to catch Villa ourselves—having given up the chase—we remained month after month in Mexico,
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