usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.
Id. at 477–78 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that defendants who committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that would permit the judge or jury to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. Id. at 489. Because the mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court reversed the judgments of this court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Id.
On remand in Jackson v. Norris,[1] we rejected the State's argument that the Eighth Amendment violation could be cured by severing the capital-murder statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-101(c) (Repl. 1997), to provide for a sentence of life with parole. 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906. We explained that the imposition of that sentence would not allow for consideration of Miller evidence. Id., 426 S.W.3d 906. Instead, we severed language from the statute "so that, for juveniles convicted of capital murder, all
- ↑ Jackson v. Hobbs was styled Jackson v. Norris on remand.
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